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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
STEVEN CRAIG TURNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
14591 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE Of THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from th^ judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, whict 
found him guilty by a jury trial of Iviolation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amerided. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 14 and 15, 1976, appellant was tried 
and convicted of aggravated robbery 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), a^ 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of five years to life in prison, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent petitions the Court to affirm 
the conviction of appellant by a jury in the lower court, 
in violation of 
amended. He was 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 22, 197 5, Jerry Graham was robbed at 
Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and Highland Drive, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. On July 22, 1975, appellant 
was cirrested in connection with the robbery, identified 
by Mr. Graham as the assailant and on July 23, 1975, 
a complaint was filed accusing the appellant of 
aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1953), as amended in 1975. Trial by jury 
was held on April 14 and 15, 1976. After presentation 
of all the evidence, the following six instructions, 
among others, were given to the jury: 
"Instruction No. 8: Under the 
law of the State of Utah, robbery is 
the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of 
another from his or her person, or 
immediate presence, against the will 
of that person, which taking is 
accomplished by means of force or 
fear. 
A person commits an aggravated 
robbery, which is a first degree felony, 
if, in the course of committing a 
robbery, that person uses a deadly 
weapon. A deadly weapon means anything 
that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury. 
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Under the law, ^ n act of using 
a deadly weapon is deemed to be 'in the 
course of committing a robbery,f as 
that phrase is used in these instructions, 
if the use of a deadly weapon occurs in an 
attempt to commit, orf during the commission 
of a robbery. I 
One acts 'unlawfully1 in the taking 
of personal property in the possession of 
another, as used in t^ hese instructions 
if the actor takes such property wrong-
fully, without rights or permission and 
with the deliberate i|ntent to commit a 
crime. J 
Under the law, one acts intentionally 
or with intent with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or as a result of his conduct 
when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or to cause the 
result. | 
Intent with which an act is done 
denotes a state of mind and connotes 
purpose in so acting. Intent, being a 
state of mind, is noti always susceptible 
of proof by direct ana positive evidence and 
may ordinarily be inferred from acts, 
conduct, statements a^ id circumstances." 
9: You are instructed 
a deadly weapon unless 
"Instruction No.i 
that a firearm is not 
it is loaded. The Ut$h Code defines when 
a weapon is deemed to have been loaded in 
76-10-502, but if froijn the evidence you have 
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 
gun testified to in tlfiis case was loaded, 
you must find the defendant not guilty of 
aggravated robbery anc^  consider the lesser 
included offense of rdbbery." 
"Instruction No. 10: You are instructed 
that for the purposes of this case, that a 
'dangerous weapon1 me^ns any item that in 
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the manner of its use or intended 
use is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. In construing 
whether an item, object or thing not 
commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon, the character 
of the instrument, object or thing; 
the character of the wound produced, if 
any; and the manner in which the instru-
ment, object, or thing was used shall be 
determinative. 
'Firearms' means pistols, revolvers, 
sawed-off rifle and/or any device that 
could be used as a weapon from which 
is expelled a projective by any force." 
"Instruction No, 11: You are 
instructed that facsimile is defined as: 
An exact and precise copy of anything. 
An exact reproduction, for example, the 
signature reproduced by rubber stamp." 
"Instruction No. 12: You are further 
instructed that a facsimile of a firearm 
is any instrument that by its appearance 
resembles a firearm*" 
"Instruction No. 13: Before you can 
convict the defendant of the crime of 
aggravated robbery, as charged in the 
Information, you must find from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 22nd day of 
July, 197 5, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, Steven Craig Turner, 
unlawfully and intentionally took money or 
property from Jerry Graham. 
2. That said property or money was 
in the possession or immediate presence 
of Jerry Graham. 
3. That the taking of said money or 
property from Jerry Graham was accomplished 
by means of force or fear. 
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4. That in the course of taking 
all of the 
the offense beyond 
t is your duty to 
On the other 
said money or property the defendant, 
Steven Craig Turner, 'used a deadly 
weapon consisting of a firearm or 
a facsimile of a firdarm. 
If you belive tljat the evidence 
establishes each and 
essential elements of 
a reasonable doubt, i 
convict the defendant 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements 
then you should find the defendant not 
guilty of aggravated robbery and then 
consider the lesser included offense 
of robbery in accordance with the 
following instruction." 
Closing arguments were then heard and the jury 
began its deliberation. After the jury had left the 
courtroom time was granted by the beptch to except to the 
instructions. The State indicated it had no objections. 
Appellant objected to the above recited instructions (T.123-
124) on the grounds that the instructions were confusing and 
conflicting and further objected to the statute as being 
unconstitutionally vague. 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1953), AS AMENDED IN 
1975, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGU$ AS APPLIED TO 
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended, 
insofar as is pertinent to the case at bar, reads as 
follows: 
"(1) A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile 
of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon." 
The complaint under which appellant was charged 
and convicted reads: 
"That the said Steven Craig Turner 
at the time and place aforesaid, robbed 
Jerry Graham, and in so doing, used a 
deadly weapon, to wit: a gun or facsimile 
thereof." (R.8). 
Appellant contends that the court, in attempting 
to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "facsimile," 
did so in a manner as to render Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1953), as amended, unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
appellant in this case. The Utah Supreme Court has spoken 
on more than one occasion to the matter of unconstitutional 
vagueness of statutory law. As has been the case for many 
years in Utah, there is a very strong presumption in favor 
of the validity of legislative enactments, and where possible, 
the Supreme Court must uphold the validity of an act rather 
than declare it unconstitutional. Tygreen v. Magna Water 
Co., et al., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950); Greaves 
v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (1974). The feeling of the court 
has been that only where it is impossible to resolve 
doubts will an act be declared invalid for uncertainty 
or vagueness. Tygreen, supra; Nowers v. Oakdeny 110 Utah 
25, 169 P.2d 108 (1946). The test for uncertainty or 
vagueness was enunciated succinctly in State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). The Court, in declaring 
the criminal statute involved unconstitutional, set forth 
guidelines to be followed: 
"Concerning the question of 
uncertainty or vagueness of statutes, 
the authorities seem to be in accord 
that the test a statute must meet to 
be valid is: It must be sufficiently 
definite (a) to inform persons of 
ordinary intelligence/ who would be 
law abiding, what th^ir conduct must 
be to conform to its requirements; 
(b) to advise a defendant accused of 
violating it just what constitutes 
the offense with which he is charged, 
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform 
interpretation and application by those 
charged with responsibility of applying 
and enforcing it." 
This test was adhered to and reaffirlmed in Greaves v. 
States, supra» 
In the case at bar, appelljant seemingly is not 
challenging the validity of Section 76-6-302, per se, but 
is challenging the statute as applied to him in his trial 
after the trial judge, via jury instructions, defined the 
word "facsimile." It should be noted that appellant did 
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not offer an alternative definition to the one given 
by the court in Instuction 11. The Court, in defining 
"facsimile" in Instruction 11, apparently consulted 
Ballentine's Law Dictionary for reference, since as 
appellant states, there is very little in the way of 
legal dissertation on the precise meaning of the word 
per se, in a legal sense. This is understandable, 
however, for it would seem that the word "facsimile," 
speaking in a legal sense, is a non-technical rather than 
a technical word, and as such, there would be little 
occasion for legal interpretation. However, since the 
word appears in not only the challenged statute, but in the 
complaint, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury 
as to the meaning to be given such a "non-technical" word 
used in a "technical" (legal) sense. Failure to have 
done so could have resulted in error. McBride v. Woods, 
124 Colo. 384, 391, 238 P.2d 183 (1951); Lucas v. Michigan 
C.R. Co., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893). 
The word facsimile appears in Ballentine's 
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, as follows: 
"Facsimile. An exact and precise 
copy of anything. An exact reproduction, 
for example, the signature reproduced by 
rubber stamp." 11 Am.Jur.2d B. & W. § 
210. 
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This definition coincides! verbatim with that 
given in Instruction No. 11. 
In his brief, appellant gives us the benefit of 
other definitions and synonyms of the word in question. 
Websters New Unabridged Dictionary, | Section Edition, 
gives the following definition: 
"1. Act of making a copy, 
imitation. 
2. An exact aikd detailed 
copy of anything, as of a book, 
document, painting, or statute. 
Syn. See duplicate." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English 
Language gives the following definition of "facsimile:" 
"An exact copy or reproduction; 
a perfect imitation of a work of art, 
manuscript, engraving, coin, stamp, 
medal or other original; in a loose 
sense, an exact model or counterpart. 
Syn.: see Duplicate; model." 
Case law produces a definition for the word 
"imitation" in the case of People v. Delgardo, 14 6 N.Y.S.2d 
350, 356; 1 Misc.2d 821 (1955): 
"The word •imitation1 when applied 
to pistols and revolvers means so nearly 
resembling the genuine as to mislead, 
with the apparent object of producing, 
and likely to produce, upon the minds of 
those against whom it is to be used, the 
belief that the imitation weapon is capable 
of producing all the injurious consequences 
to the victim as the use of the genuine 
article itself." (Emphasis added.) 
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Now that an "arsenal" of definitions of the 
word "facsimile" has been established, both in a non-
legal (Websters; Funk and Wagnalls) and legal sense 
(Ballentine's, Black), what is the meaning of "facsimile"? 
What did the legislature have in mind when enacting 
Section 76-6-302, specifically using the phrase " . . . 
(a) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. . . . "? 
(Emphasis added.) Certainly any of the definitions 
mentioned, including the one given by the trial judge 
in Instruction No. 11, would suffice. The test to use 
in the interpretation of a word or phrase in a statute 
has been set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Packard, supra, at 375: 
"The limitations of language are 
such that neither absolute exactitude of 
expression nor complete precision of 
meaning are to be expected, and such 
standard cannot be required. On the 
other hand there is no disagreement 
among the courts that where a rule is 
set up, the violation of which subjects 
one to criminal punishment, the 
restrictions upon conduct should be 
described with sufficient certainty, 
so that persons of ordinary intelligence, 
desiring to obey the law, may know how 
to govern themselves in conformity with it, 
and that no one should be compelled at 
the peril of life, liberty or property, 
to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes." 
-10-
This test was reiterated by the Supreme Court 
of Utah once again in Greaves v. Stpte, supra at 807. 
Speaking to a complaint that the criminal statute 
involved was void for vagueness, the court said: 
11
. • . the presumption of validity 
hereinabovestated#giVes rise to the 
rule that a statute ViH not be declared 
unconstitutional for that reason (vague-
ness) if under any sensible interpretation 
of its language it cfcn be given practical 
effect. The requirement is that it must 
be sufficiently clear and definite to 
inform persons of ordinary intelligence 
what their conduct must be to conform to 
its requirements and to advise one accused 
of violating it what constitutes the offense 
with which he is changed." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the Greaves case, supr^ at 806f the Court also 
laid down the test to be used in th^ judicial determination 
of the constitutionality of statute^: 
"In regard to tfye judicial 
determination of the constitutionality 
of statutes there ar^ certain principles 
relating to statutory construction, to 
be taken into consideration. Because 
the duty rests upon tihe court to determine 
the scope of the powers of all three 
branches of government, they have a 
special responsibility to exercise a high 
degree of caution and restraint to keep 
themselves within the limitations of the 
judicial power in order not to infringe 
upon the prerogatives of the executive 
or the legislative branches. In harmony 
with that policy it i|s the well-established 
rule that legislative enactments are 
endowded with a strong presumption of 
validity; and that thjey should not be 
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declared unconstitutional if there 
is any reasonable basis upon which they 
can be found to come within the 
constititutional framework; and that 
a statute will not be stricken down 
as being unconstitutional unless it 
appears to be so beyond a reasonable 
doubt." (Emphasis added.) 
There are several questions to be answered in 
determining as to whether this "reasonable doubt test" 
and the test enunciated in State v. Packard, supra, have 
been met. Is there really a reasonable doubt in the minds 
of men of ordinary intelligence as to what the legislature 
meant when it enacted a law (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1953), as amended in 1975) prohibiting the use of a "fire-
arm or a facsimile of a firearm" in the commission of a 
robbery? Was there a reasonble doubt in appellant's mind, 
when he committed this robbery, as to what conduct was 
prohibited by the statute? Was there really a reasonable 
doubt in the minds of the jury members as to what the 
meaning of the word "facsimile" and the phrase "facsimile 
of a firearm" meant? Respondent respectfully sbumits that 
the answers to the questions propounded are succinctly in 
the negative. 
It would seem after careful reading of the 
various definitions of "facsimile," and after reading 
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People v. Delgardo, supra, that the word "facsimile" is 
synonymous with "imitation," "duplicate," "resemblance," 
etc., and that this is what the legislature had in mind 
when enacting the statute, as did the court when giving 
Instruction Nos. 11 and 12. It would also seem appropriate 
to conclude that appellant was put on fair notice that if 
he committed a robbery by use of an 
something that resembled or was the 
actual firearm or 
imitation of a firearm 
he would have to answer to the people of the State of Utah 
for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953) , as amended 
in 1975. 
Apparently appellant would have this Court take 
the view that "facsimile of a firearm" be construed through 
the eyes of the criminal, rather th4n through the eyes of the 
victim or the eyes of the jury. As was so adequately expressed 
in People v. Delgardo, supra, the purpose of the use of an 
"imitation" or "facsimile of a pistol" is ". . .to produce, 
upon the minds of those against whom it is to be used, the 
belief that the imitation weapon is capable of producing 
all the injurious consequences to the victim as the use of the 
genuine article itself." Certainly this is the thought the 
legislature had in mind when drafting Section 7 6-6-302. 
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Certainly the evidence in the case at bar bears out the 
fact that the victim believed the appellant to have 
been armed with a pistol, whether or not the object 
was in fact a pistol (T.10 and T. 22) . 
"Q. Now, you indicated 
you saw about an inch and a 
half of a gun pointing out of a 
shirt, is that what you stated? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you explain to me 
what you mean pointing out of his 
shirt? 
A. He had his hand under the 
barrell, was just up under his shirt. 
All I could see of the shirt down over 
it was an inch and a half of the 
barrell. 
Q. Sure it wasnft a piece of 
pipe? 
A. I don't believe it to be, no." 
Clearly it can be seen that the victim believed 
the object pointing out of appellant's shirt to be a gun 
of some sort. Whether or not it was actually a gun or 
not is immaterial* The important criteria, according 
to the statute, is that the object must have in fact been a 
firearm (pistol) or so closely resemble a firearm (facsimile 
of a pistol) as to induce belief on behalf of the victim 
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that the object was in fact a fireairm. This does 
not seem as complicated as appellant would have 
this Court believe. If appellant's theory is 
followed, those persons such as appellant who 
desire to participate in activity s^ ich as 
robbery will now be able to reap the lucrative 
fruits of an aggravated robbery while only 
being required to pay the price of $. simple 
lesser included offense of robbery, by the 
use of something which, though it resembled 
a firearm, was not the precise, exacpt, dimension 
by dimension replica of the firearm appellant had 
in mind. Certainly this is not the thinking 
behind the statute, and certainly such an 
interpretation could not and was not given to 
Instructions 11 and 12, either individually or 
collectively. 
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Instruction 11, when read with Instruction 12, 
does not open up a "vast area of definition and interpre-
tation," but merely gives the jury the definition to 
be followed while exercising its function, i.e., to 
determine whether or not the object used in the robbery, 
based upon the evidence given, was in fact a firearm 
or a facsimile thereof. If in fact the jury found 
appellant guilty of aggravated robbery on the theory 
that a facsimile of a firearm was used, the jury was 
required to find as fact that the instrument used so 
exactly and precisely resembled a firearm so as to 
actually be mistaken for such a weapon. This is in 
essence what Instructions 11 and 12, when read together, 
mean. 
Appellant's contention that Instructions 12 
and 9, when read together, compound the vagueness of the 
statute is wholly without foundation. A careful exam-
ination of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended 
in 19 75, reveals that there are several modes by which 
aggravated robbery can be committed. One is by use of 
a firearm, another by use of a facsimile or an imitation 
of a firearm. The complaint charges that the crime was 
committed by the use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun 
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or facsimile thereof. Instruction 9 sets out the 
requirements to be met in order for 
fied as a deadly weapon, should the 
matter of fact that a real gun was ujsed. Instruction 12 
a gun to be classi-
jury find that as a 
sets forth the definition of a "facsimile of a firearm", 
which instruction of course would bel used should the jury 
find that a real gun was not used. jThus, Instructions 
9 and 12 are absolutely necessary in order for the jury 
to make a finding based on the evidence set forth and 
the statute under which appellant wafe charged. No 
conflict or vagueness exists; if anything, a marvelous 
job of clarification. 
Appellant concludes his argument in Point I 
of his brief by submitting that the c^ bject used could 
have been "a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted 
grey, grey plastic tubing or any number of things that 
are neither deadly or dangerous and $till appellant 
could have been convicted of aggravated robbery." According 
to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as 
amended in 1975, if "three-inch rubber tubing painted 
grey", or "grey plastic tubing" was ^o designed as to give 
one, particularly Mr. Jerry Graham, the victim, the 
belief or fear that an actual gun was being directed 
at him, and if the jury found as a matter of fact that 
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such tubing so closely resembled an actual firearm 
as to give the very appearance of one, then appellant 
could have been convicted of aggravated robbery, and 
rightLy so. On the other hand, the jury may have 
found that a real firearm was used, and that it was 
loaded. If so, appellant could have been convicted of 
aggravated robbery, and rightly so. In either case, 
Instructions 9, 11, and 12 were all very necessary for 
the jury deliberation. The jury had many decisions 
to make, among which were to find as a matter of fact 
whether or not the object used was a firearm, whether 
or not it was loaded if it was a firearm, if the object 
was not a firearm, did it so closely resemble a firearm 
by its exactness and resemblance so as to give the victim 
the appearance of being an actual firearm. These matters 
are all within the province of the jury, and as such the 
jury must be instructed thereon. People v. McKinney, 
111 Cal. App. 2d 690, 245 P.2d 24 (1952); State v. 
Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 499 P.2d 81 (1972); Hutton 
v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965); State 
v. Faulkner, 5 N.C. App. 113, 168 S.E.2d 9 (1969). Each 
of the above cases dealt with the issue of whether or 
not it was the function of the jury to determine whether 
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or not an object used was an actual firearm or an 
imitation, whether or not such firearm, if real, was 
loaded, and whether or not the object used was a 
dangerous or deadly weapon within the confines of the 
statutes involved. 
Respondent submits that the Instructions given 
by the trial court did not change the meaning of the 
statute so as to leave it vague or uncertain, but 
merely explained the various elementls of the offense 
with which appellant was charged and further defined 
certain "technical" (legally speaking) words which were 
necessary to arrive at a just verdict, based upon the 
evidence presented. Specifically, Instruction 11 
defined "facsimile" as taken from a Jreliable legal 
source; the term "facsimile" was used in Instruction 
12, thus the need for Instruction 11, 
Instruction 11, Instruction 12 couldj read: "You are 
further instructed that an exact or precise copy, or 
imitation of a firearm is any instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm." Thps the need for 
both instructions - they compliment <pne another. They 
must be read together and taken as a whole, as was 
expressed by this court in State v. ^uerts, 11 Utah 2d 
345 at 352, 359 P.2d 12 (1961): 
Based upon 
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"This also can be said, adroit 
counsel may dissent an instruction, 
and by attempting to hang the whole 
case on separate parts thereof, make 
a plausible argument that error was 
committed. But when the instructions 
are considered as a whole, and in light 
of the evidence and the particular 
charges lodged against the defendant, 
as they should be, there is no doubt 
that the jury was clearly and 
accurately advised of specific charges. 
Such is the case at bar. Appellant has in 
reality attempted to "dissent" each instruction separately, 
concluding that there are contradictions therein, while 
at the same time proceeding under the guise of argument 
that the Instructions, when read together, are such as 
to render the statute vague. When read together, the 
Instructions make clear the evidence needed in order for 
appellant to be convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1953), as amended in 1975. The statute is clear as to 
the conduct prohibited, both to the citizen of ordinary 
intelligence who desires to obey the law, and to the 
citizen of ordinary intelligence who desires to disobey 
the law. Proof of a reasonable doubt has not been sub-
mitted to show that the statute was vague as applied to 
plaintiff. Greaves v. State, supra. 
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POINT II ' 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
Ai-.L ., • •.•;; i-.v ': ,C AND CONTRADICTORY. 
Appellant (jlleqoi; conflict between Instructions 
:- •.• "<: h : ;ad] y >.,..,.-, " 
: terras of lib liliPtihor^i or causing death or serious 
bodi V-T i-• l n *~v
 : "C--< » "j ^  I r i s Y <mo t i ^  1°^"^'^ ~: ''d .v 'jerous 
wtjapf • •_i_-1 . . L.L, capabiii.1 ,« . jdiiju^ ucatn 
or serious bodily injur\. rIV.-i • po-nts should bo noted: 
oojii , , i-Ly ' -^!i; Mc»t ; lf inLO ;ujcn a category if 
did i ^ r possess tho capability . *f ir^ :i inf ir,^  mc* 1 a 
Instruct"" on " 'vr use by the court* io doing, he 
car:no+ ' J W comply*nL dbout > 
i:ic.Lr..^ion, People v. Darby, -J >, <- i ,M >. . «, 4. ' 
:>->'• i1 v. '-; \ (1952); State v, Stewart
 r l««l ^*' ^, 
] *•.,-.«, / ' fii ^ ilber, supra, ttie defendant, 
"
s
 .! i prosecution for r-ap. requested .-ir^ i nstruction 
, - • .- ^ %!• u'j'. . L'ien comp > ,-mc.ci 
about the confusing use or the phrase in the instruction 
qjiver The couiLdi^rir.r.f-"• * ' 
• o : 'cving comment" A-. Evermore, *ve tic- •: >: believe 
appellant is in •> position to complain about the use 01 
words, as it was at his invitation." Such was the case 
in State v. Stewart, supra, where the defendant offered 
an instruction, which was accepted by the court and 
given. The defendant then claimed error in giving of 
the instruction. The court flatly dismissed such an 
argument by simply declaring, "Prepared instruction 
No. 9 was given. Defendant cannot claim error when 
one of his offered instructions is given". Such is 
the case at bar. Appellant offered Instruction No. 
10, and he cannot claim error because of an allegation 
of conflict with Instruction 8. Be that as it may, 
there is no conflict between the two instructions, 
as logic infers in the earlier explanation. 
Appellant further argues that Instructions 
8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 are all conflicting and leave the 
jury with at least five possible methods of convicting, 
all contradictory. Such is not the case when the 
Instructions, which should be considered together, are 
considered as a whole. State v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 
267,, 258 P.2d 453 (1951). Instruction 8 sets forth 
the elements necessary to prove in order to convict 
of robbery or aggravated robbery. It specifies that a 
deadly weapon must be used to convict of aggravated 
robbery and further defines what a deadly weapon consists 
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of. Instruction 9 rots forth the conditions under 
vhicf~ a Hrearn is f u be considered a d~a •' ! • *.% •-* 
'.' . -• . necessary because the appeila..-
is charged in -he complaint with ising a firearm "<r 
facsimile thr -m, '. • —-"-_ 
The statute uia!-;r whjcn no AS uhcM yed also nakes use 
- . « ' • ' H r e a r m " v t^ r - - ^ " , , _i_o c T r i / i r " c e JLU 
t hI ' "onr -h .
 A +• a a p n u i ^ ^ 
f i r e . i - . ..v.:- * I . s o d e t e r T i i n j d , t h e y m u s t f£n .• 1 r -. 
r-r*"* * ' ^ ~ S Lu wh-*^ u 
:_.«*., ; ^ c . L ^ i n g , v / i L i i : . ,. «. p i ^ v i , c e , w h e t h e r o r n t t1 • 
f i r e a . m v,-,-,;* , < - l a s s i f i e d a s a d e a d l y w e a p o n , Tuus 
9 . • 
I n s t r u c t i o n 10 was o f f e r e d by a p p e l l a n t , ' h u f 
. ^»-v -w~ o
 Ui ^ e c l a i m e d , d e s p i t e t h e far1* • ' 
y L, u • 
Instructions • ;nd - 1 a c needed since appellant 
is rhr- .'•-...- .. - • • : : 
or ruL^^tiLiu Lhereo: .^iai-Hions, c*s mentioned 
previously, explain the definitio: i of "facsimile of 
i 
I n s t r u c t i o n 13 s e t s f o r t h t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e 
e r i m ^ w h i ^ h - i ' 1 : ^ v-ip p r o v e n h ^ r n r c a c o n v i c t i c r . • •' 
. : . ' j i c : ^ ; r i ,
 : wl id cl l i s t ihe s u b j e c t u i r i i i r 
- 2 3 -
appeal, states: 
"4. That in the course of 
taking said money or property the 
defendant, Steven Craig Turner, 
used a deadly weapon consisting 
of a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm." 
This Instruction apprises the jury of the fact that 
before they can find appellant guilty of aggravated 
robbery, they must first find one of two things: (1) 
that Steven Craig Turner, the appellant, used a deadly 
weapon consisting of a firearm (in which case, according 
to Instruction 9, the firearm must be found to be 
loaded); or (2) that Steven Craig Turner used a facsimile 
of a firearm (thus the need for Instructions 11 and 12). 
This is precisely what the statute prohibits, and is 
precisely what the appellant is charged with. 
It is true that the language in paragraph 2 
of Instruction 8, in which it is said that one committing 
robbery by the use of a deadly weapon commits aggravated 
robbery, is narrower than that used in the statute; 
for the statute precludes not only the use of a deadly 
weapon, but the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, a knife or facsimile of a knife. However, 
Instructions 9, 11, and 12 cover the meaning of firearm 
and facsimile of a firearm. 
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vhuc" i i- !:^  seen that
 ( -:
u
-^n f-av.^n an-1 r^on 
-.• group of citizens of ordinary in Lei] ioonco , the 
necessarv : "cria and mean i ;•"' to be yiv^ii various terms 
.; ^  f:hci: judging -^r the evidence. Each instruction is 
needed,, Each is legally sound, i nd i v i du: 1 iy and collov lively. 
T h < - \ , • ••* • . . . . : • . }•. • :r>e-i . t 
has appellant shown that a different resu] t could have been 
obtained had other instructions h—^n civ-^n ^^ i-v>o-- gxven 
refused. State v, Anderson, 
P . 2 d < -o i I • : 
robbery hv eit_n - - using a deadly .vea^on O U K M S . U\ jf 
-
 rir^cirr • ^  '.irpTinri r-( robber^ *^  ,. •.- , facsimile 
There was sufficient evidence to support either theory, 
-.
 ]
 - ' . -'
 s
 \ L on 
and as long as. th" instructions clearly distinguished.. 
1
 ^
 :
-
ri
 ^  — *-> ' > l a d a y , 
i . A'' ] - i i 1^70). " V coirL r.'ated m Golladay at 
201: 
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"Thus, a defendant may be charged 
with committing a single crime in 
two or more ways and proof of one 
will uphold the indictment or in-
formation. But before the jury 
can be instructed on and allowed to 
consider the various ways of committing 
the crime alleged, there must be 
sufficient evidence to support the 
instructions. Moreover, the in-
structions must clearly distinguish 
the alternative theories and require 
the necessity for a unanimous verdict 
on either of the alternatives. When 
such is the case, the prosecutor need 
not be forced to elect, for fear that 
half of the jury will find the defendant 
guilty on one theory and half on 
another theory." 
The State of Utah alleged that the appellant 
committed robbery, and in so doing used a deadly weapon 
consisting of a firearm, or, in the alternative, used 
a facsimile of a firearm, which would not be a deadly 
weapon; however, Utah Code Ami. § 76-6-302 (1953), as 
amended in 19 75, does not require that a deadly weapon 
be used in order for one to be convicted of aggravated 
robbery. The requirement is met if a facsimile of a 
firearm is used. The requirement is met if a genuine 
firearm is used. The complaint is clear in that it 
alleges that either a deadly weapon, specifically a gun, 
was used; or, in the alternative, a facsimile of a 
deadly weapon, consisting, specifically, of a facsimile 
of a gun. 
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A p p e l l a n t was p c i >;; no t i.ce a s zo whcr- cc^ud'icK 
was prohibited. He •" 
jury so found. No erioi prejulicia* to *:hc appellant 
can bo found. 
For !!•'• • casor.s stated, respondent: respect-
fully request:' -;-^ - f^  ; :iov-v; - 1 ' " • *" - rve 
coi iviction rendered • ou- i . 
Respect rul i y suhr.itted, 
ROBERT i>. ii^ ^^ r,.. 
Attorney General 
A • i.i.i.i^i . . . .-iKKETT 
^ssistanl Attornev nc-nm 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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